Reading the Middle East correctly will be vital to Israel’s security

Prime Minister Netanyahu has shown that he too adheres to the ‘Begin Doctrine,’ which says that no country that threatens the existence of the Jewish state will be allowed the weapons to do so.

Without doubt, this was a much more difficult proposition in the case of Iran than it was in 1981 in Iraq or 2007 in Syria.

October 7 2023 set the wheels in motion for the 12-day war

After a series of chain reactions resulting from the gross miscalculation by Hamas and its sponsor, Iran, ironically, the Middle East has been transformed.

Israeli ingenuity, resilience, and sacrifice underpinned it all.

With Hamas reduced to a guerrilla force, Lebanon finally and forcefully trying to reclaim its own country from a weakened Hezbollah, and Syria removed from the Iranian sphere of influence, Israel was able to turn its attention, almost unhindered, to Iran itself.

Israel created the conditions that made it easier and safer for US forces to be able to send in the B2 bombers and for President Trump to make the political decision to do so.

The urgent nature of dealing with Iran lay in the need to reduce its ballistic missile arsenal, with rapidly increasing production levels, and the confirmation that Iran had severely breached its international nuclear obligations and was rapidly approaching nuclear bomb capability.

The perceived and real so-called ‘daylight’ between Israel and America has been shown to be radically reduced.

Having said that, as I have written previously, Trump’s desire to end wars is a very good thing, as long as it is not merely a short-term fix, kicking the can of a potentially bigger war down the road.

The Abraham Accords from Trump’s first term have shown their immense value and durability.

If Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa really does join the Accords, as some rumours suggest he is considering, it will not only complete the removal of Syria from Iranian influence, but also simultaneously reduce Turkish influence in Damascus.

Of course, bringing Saudia Arabia into the Accords would be the ultimate success, with enormous long terms benefits, depending on the price Trump would expect Israel to pay.

Despite the nature of the relationship, arguably the closest Israel and the US have ever been, it comes with two major costs – the outsourcing of certain policy decisions to the US, and significant elements of risk because some critical differences between Israel and the US do exist. Especially in regards to Iran and Gaza and potentially Judea/Samaria/West Bank.

Regarding Iran, the Pentagon has said that its own assessment is that Iran’s nuclear capabilities have only been set back one to two years.

Almost all commentators agree that without regime change, Iran is still heading for a nuclear weapon and has the capacity to rebuild and achieve one, sometime in the not-too-distant future.

Trump believes that the current Iranian regime is capable of ideological change; Israelis do not.

When it comes to Gaza, the balance in Israel at almost all levels has shifted prioritisation from the total defeat of Hamas, to, firstly, securing the release of the 50 remaining hostages. 20 of whom are thought to be alive.

This is a national trauma that cannot begin to be healed whilst hostages remain in captivity.

Netanyahu believes both aims can be achieved, whilst most believe one pays a price to the other.

On the question of the day after in Gaza, there are significant differences between Trump and Netanyahu, but the answer is likely to be taken out of Israel’s hands.

Whilst in many matters, the US has some history of misreading the Middle East, looking at it through the prism of Western eyes, in others it has a much better understanding.

Especially when it comes to the concept of ‘saving face,’ which works both ways.

Trump’s restriction on an Israeli response to Iran initially breaking the ceasefire deal and indeed to the US’s own refusal to retaliate to the telegraphed Iranian attack on US forces in Qatar mirrors two earlier examples of this.

When Trump, following the assassination of Soleimani in 2020 did not retaliate to Iranian attacks on US bases in the Middle East, he was able to take no action by belittling the attacks, stating that the damage was minimal and that no US forces were killed, allowing the US to ‘save face,’ but close the chapter.

As Trump similarly pressured Israel regarding the current ceasefire breach by Iran.

Likewise, during the 1973 Yom Kippur war, after Sharon had crossed the Suez Canal and encircled the Egyptian Third Army, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger forced Israel to allow the Egyptians to return home with their weapons, so that despite losing the war, to their own people they appeared as victors and came back to a peace deal as such, rather than in shame.

Iran is portraying its humiliation in the 12-day war as a victory, but there is no evidence at all that its leadership is now seeking peace.

Nor that Khomeini is another Sadat.

Reading the Middle East correctly will be vital to Israel’s security.

The current meetings that took place earlier this week in the US between President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu felt different from usual. They seemed to have had less pomp and more seriousness.

The usual press conference was missing. A stage-managed dinner took its place, with selected journalists asking some questions, whilst the Israeli press was excluded to avoid awkward questions.

A follow-up meeting between the two leaders was held, and they were joined by Vice President Vance.

With both Iran and Gaza, American-imposed deals, should they go wrong, will leave Israel paying the price.

That is, Israel is taking all the risk and yet, making few of the decisions.

The test of the imminent Gaza deal will not be in its announcement, but rather in its implementation, outcome and long-term consequences.

The highly respected Mitchell Bard, writing in JNS, says: “For Trump, what matters is taking credit for ending the fighting, not enhancing Israeli security.”

Let’s hope that his assessment is too harsh.

Time will tell.