Iran from two angles

A much more extensive version of ‘mowing the grass’ or a real long-term fundamental change?

At the time of writing, that is the unanswered question, the assessment of which differs in the USA compared to Israel.

Whilst the Americans are focused on the Strait of Hormuz and the removal of the enriched uranium, Israelis know that without ideological regime change in Iran, ultimately the world will be faced with the same dangers again.

As well, President Trump sees regime change in Iran very differently from Israel, claiming that it has already occurred.

If the endgame is a deal with the current regime, no matter how good, it will not engender confidence in Israel. Trump himself, during his first term as president in January 2020, recognised that: “Iran never won a war, but never lost a negotiation!”

The president is very cleverly putting tremendous economic pressure on Iran with the naval blockade and other measures, but ultimately, it’s still all in order to bring the current leadership to a deal. Should an agreement be reached, Trump has said what follows, is that the economic benefits will flow to Iran. If so, this will make it easier for the regime to stay in place and to rebuild.

The Americans believe that with sufficient economic degradation of Iran, the Iranian leadership will have to choose between a deal and being overthrown. Or as Ynet put it: “For now, Trump is staying with the blockade. It is not a victory, and it is not an exit. It is a bet that Iran’s economy will collapse before his own political position does.”

The Iranian regime, should they remain in power, will have the ideological patience to easily outlast Trump’s presidency, knowing also that no future American president is likely to repeat Trump’s actions, well into the foreseeable future.

What is also true is that any deal at all will be seen by countries in the Middle East, as well as by China and Russia, as weakness on the part of the Americans. Perception is all-important.

The question of perception also applies to the Israel America relationship.

Aside from the very real costs and sacrifices made by the Israeli people to date, another serious fundamental future cost issue is the all-around reputational damage suffered by Israel, particularly in the United States.

As discussed previously, the American Democrats are virtually lost, at least for now and the Republicans are deeply divided on Israel. The younger generation, according to all polls, has turned away from Israel in varying numbers. All of this may change of course, but it will require great effort.

The fact that significant numbers in Congress and the Senate are openly in favour of cutting aid to Israel, even for defensive weapons like Iron Dome, on the spurious basis that Israel’s abilities to defend its population make Israel more aggressive and militarily adventurous, is simply alarming.

The current ceasefire, based on a 10-point plan, is defying most expectations by holding as long as it has.

This is in large part due to Trump exerting pressure, but simultaneously, being wary of any escalation that might tip the Iranians completely out of the negotiations.

In just one example of the difficulty of negotiating with the Iranian leadership, Hadar Galron discusses in Ynet the differences between how the 10-point plan reads in Farsi and English.

Point 1 in the American version says: “A binding guarantee that the U.S. and allies will not strike Iran again.” However, says Galron, when published in Farsi by Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, Point 1 reads: “A binding guarantee that the U.S. and allies will not strike Iran again and the acceptance of enrichment.”

Trump’s administration knows who they are dealing with. Secretary of State, Marco Rubio said this week that “they are all hardliners in Iran” adding “although they differ in priorities.” Sadly, not on their desire to eliminate the Jewish state.

Another cautionary note, the host of the peace talks and intermediary between the parties as ‘honest broker’ is Pakistan, a country that does not even recognise Israel.

A byproduct of Trump’s deal-making and decisions on behalf of Israel, sometimes with more and sometimes less consultation or agreement by Israel itself, is the situation left behind afterwards.

In the case of Gaza, an agreement was concluded but is not yet fully implemented. Trump has had some tremendous achievements, such as securing the release of the hostages, but simultaneously, Israel has been constrained by Trump and is in a constant state of no outright war/no complete ceasefire and with the need for Israel to maintain a continuing buffer zone that is costly and draining from multiple angles.
Furthermore, this continues to provide a public relations tool for Hamas to centre around ‘liberating Gaza’, an easier message for them to promote domestically and more internationally digestible than their ultimate aim of removing the Jewish state entirely.

It seems as if we are going through the same process in Lebanon.

With the Lebanese government incapable of, or unwilling to disarm and disband Hezbollah, Israel has returned to the buffer zone concept, last used in Lebanon after the 1982 war. A period and policy which saw the rise of Hezbollah primarily around the call to ‘liberate Lebanon’, and from which Israel ultimately and unilaterally withdrew in 2000.

This time, the buffer zone has largely been cleared of Hezbollah supporters, with Christian villages being undisturbed. Whilst the buffer zone protects northern Israeli civilians from certain types of anti-tank and arms fire, it does not provide security from rocket and drone attacks, which come from points beyond the buffer zone itself.

In both cases, we are still absent a diplomatic long-term solution and Iran’s proxies, Hamas and Hezbollah, remain players. President Trump sees the solution via inclusion in any potential deal with Iran, which may provide some interim quiet for Israel.

Both Iran and America are feeling pain, albeit in different ways. Ultimately, it will depend on who blinks first.

Israel will have to work out how it deals with the aftermath. The forthcoming elections in Israel later in the year will help determine Israel’s approach, as the various political parties jockey for electoral support.
How the war with Iran plays out, might be central to the Israeli electorate’s decision. For now, according to the polls, the electorate is looking evenly balanced between the government and opposition. Yet despite all that is going on, the polls also say that Israelis are still more divided on internal issues and the questions around support for and against Prime Minister Netanyahu himself, than on the actual war with Iran.

Am Yisrael Chai

Ron Weiser is the Honorary Life Member ZFA Executive and Honorary Life President, ZC of NSW