2026 is election year

2026 will see the Israeli people go to elections.

The question is whether that will change anything or not?

Whilst Israel is under attack all over the world in the media, on the streets and by international institutions that have been hijacked by rabid anti-Zionists or just plain Jew haters, ironically and undoubtably, the people of Israel have made massive strides in improving their own physical security and the neighbourhood, albeit at high price.

Will this be seen by the Israeli people as having been achieved because of the government, or in spite of it?

Prime Minister Netanyahu’s political base remains solid, apparently come what may, but it is insufficient to give him a majority in the Knesset. Similarly, the ‘anyone but Bibi’ factions are likewise unmoved by events and are also insufficient to form a majority by themselves.

Opinion polls are general guides at best. What makes them even less reliable this time are the fluid geopolitical events, the possibility of numerous new parties entering and the relevance of the threshold.

In Israel, a party must achieve at least 3.25% of the vote to enter the Knesset. About 4 seats. Anything less and their votes are lost, wasted. Current opinion polls work on this assumption.

As in the past, some parties, believing they may be in danger of not passing the threshold, form temporary mergers with other like-minded parties before an election and run together. Separating again after the election itself. Such mergers change the picture entirely, bypassing the threshold barrier and can mean the difference between who is available post-election to join a coalition or not.

Issues affecting voters outside of the rusted on pro or anti-Bibi camps, begin with President Trump.

Undoubtedly pro-Israel, whilst simultaneously and unashamedly, also happy to dictate both external policy and to play in Israel’s internal affairs, for as he sees it paternalistically, ‘Israel’s own good’.

How this will be viewed by the electorate is the key question.

Reaction to the Gaza plan gives us some insight. Jubilation at the return of all of the hostages, an undoubted Trump triumph, but scepticism about Phase Two which has seen Qatar and Turkey take prominent roles and the still unreformed Palestinian Authority return to Gaza. Meanwhile, Palestinian Authority rival Hamas is deepening its control over the part of Gaza not under Israeli supervision, but where most of the Gazan people live.

Trump now faces an array of options regarding Iran. And what happens with Iran, affects all its proxies. Nothing less than regime change will have any long-term impact and truly benefit the Iranian people and the region.

During his first term as president, in January 2020, Trump famously said: “Iran never won a war but never lost a negotiation!” This time, he says the talks “are different.”

After meeting with Netanyahu in the US this past week, Trump posted: “It was a very good meeting, the tremendous relationship between our two countries continues. There was nothing definitive reached other than I insisted that negotiations with Iran continue to see whether or not a deal can be consummated. If it can, I let the Prime Minister know that will be a preference. If it cannot, we will just have to see what the outcome will be.”

What Trump does or does not do vis-à-vis Iran will be interpreted by Israelis as a reflection of the value of the Trump-Netanyahu relationship.

However, without regime change, even a deal that purports to include the removal of the nuclear threat and, in an even more urgent context, the limitation of Iran’s ballistic missile numbers and production, will again be viewed with heavy scepticism by the Israeli people.

If no deal, or even a deal understood by Israelis to be poor, is achieved, then the questions are, how much further the US is willing to go, if at all. And what will Israel do?

So far, aside from rhetoric, when it comes to actual policy, nothing much separates the registered Israeli political parties on Iran, Gaza, Lebanon, the Houthis or Syria – if any of them have a distinct policy at all.

On Judea/Samaria/West Bank, increasing Israeli control over this area could become an election issue, although currently it remains muted.

Another emerging issue, still only in its embryonic stages, but of importance, is one of independence to make policy and to act on it. A sort of discussion as to whether Zionism and self-determination still fully overlap. In other words, just how much can Zionism be outsourced?

A small reflection of this is Netanyahu reannouncing something he has previously done many times over the years, but seems more serious about now – the need for Israel to wean itself off American aid, as well as to produce more munitions inside Israel.

With American Democrats becoming increasingly unreliable and Republicans likewise becoming more divided on Israel and foreign aid generally, this is starting to become more pressing.

Aside from Trump and Iran, two of the standout internal issues remain drafting the haredim and judicial reform. Two complex and fundamental matters which are also linked to each other.

Here, there are clear differences between the various parties.

The haredim have a combined built-in constituency of about 15% of the Knesset, currently 18 seats. None of the opposition parties is in favour of joining a Netanyahu-led government before or after the elections, even though this makes personalities and not policies the issue. It is the haredim who keep Netanyahu in government and this stance only encourages greater haredi demands and makes the haredim the natural partners of Netanyahu.

In other words, the oppositions’ stand off on Netanyahu, also plays a role in giving the haredim much great bargaining power.

The high court is insisting that the government pass laws to compel the haredim to serve in the IDF, or at least to do some form of national service.

Which brings us to the other main domestic issue, judicial reform. Leaving out the technical details, this is essentially about what the balance should be between the Knesset and the courts. About how Israel’s democracy should be managed.

There is a complete breakdown of trust between them.

Just one manifestation of this is that Netanyahu has refused to allow a state inquiry into 7 October for a number of reasons, not the least of which is that such an inquiry would be headed by a judge.

From Netanyahu’s point of view, the election will decide the issue. If he wins, he will say this is proof that no state inquiry is needed.

There’s still a long road ahead, but from here on in everything will need to be looked at through the lens of the forthcoming elections and whether we have a continuation of the status quo or a clear direction, one way or the other.

Many people like to blame ‘the system’. There is no perfect form of democracy, and indeed, the electoral system could do with many improvements. But that is the easy and lazy way out. Dreaming and waiting for another political system is of zero usefulness in 2026.

For almost two decades, Netanyahu has shown that he is the master politician. The longest surviving leader in the democratic world. If, after all that has happened, the opposition fails to unseat him, they have no one to blame but themselves.